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INTRODUCTION
The STS-43 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report contains a summary of the
vehicle subsystem operations during the forty-second flight of the Space Shuttle
Program and the ninth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Atlantis (OV-104). In
addition to the Atlantis vehicle, the flight vehicle consisted of an External
Tank (ET) designated as ET-47 (LVT-40), three Space Shuttle main engines
(SSME's) (serial numbers 2024, 2012, and 2028 in positions 1, 2, and 3,
respectively), and two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRB's) designated as BI-045.
The primary objective of the STS~43 mission was to successfully deploy the
Tracking and Data Relay Satellite-E/lnertial Upper Stage (TDRS-E/IUS) satellite
and to perform all operations necessary to support the requirements of the
Shuttle Solar Backscatter Ultraviolet (SSBUV) payload and the Space Station Heat
Pipe Advanced Radiator Element (SHARE-II).
The sequence of events for the STS-43 mission is shown in Table I, and the
official Orbiter Problem Tracking List is presented in Table II. In addition,
each Orbiter subsystem anomaly is discussed in the applicable subsystem section
of the report and a reference to the assigned tracking number is provided.
Official ET, SRB, and SSME anomalies are also discussed in their respective
sections of the report and the assigned tracking number is also shown.
The crew for this forty-second flight of the Space Shuttle vehicle was John E.
Blaha, Col., USAF, Commander; Michael A. Baker, Lt. Cdr., USN, Pilot; ShannonV.
Lucid, Ph.D, Mission Specialist 1; G. David Low, Mission Specialist 2; and James
C. Adamson, Lt. Col., USA, Mission Specialist 3. STS-43 was the third Space
Shuttle flight for the Commander and Mission Specialist 1, the second Space
Shuttle flight for Mission Specialist 2 and 3, and the first Space Shuttle
flight for the Pilot.
SUMMARY
The launch of the STS-43 vehicle occurred at 214:15:01:59.986 G.m.t.
(11:01:59.986 a.m. e.d.t. on August 2, 1991) from launch pad A at Kennedy Space
Center (KSC), and all subsystems performed satisfactorily during the ascent
phase. All SSME and redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM) start sequences
occurred as expected and launch phase performance was satisfactory in all
respects. First stage ascent performance was normal with SRB separation, entry,
deceleration, and water impact occurring as anticipated. Performance of the
88ME's, ET, and main propulsion system (MPS) was also normal, with main engine
cutoff (MECO) occurring approximately 505.9 seconds after lift-off. No orbital
maneuvering subsystem (OMS) 1 maneuver was required as a direct insertion
trajectory was flown. The OMS 2 maneuver was performed at 214:15:41:50.9 G.m.t.
The 142.7-second maneuver imparted a differential velocity (6V) of 222.2 ft/sec
and placed the Orbiter in the planned circular orbit. Both SRB's were
successfully recovered and returned to KSC for inspection and disassembly. No
1
significant discrepancies were noted in the subsystem performance data. The
successful launch of STS-43 followed two launch countdown scrubs which are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
The SSME 3 controller went to halt when an unrecoverable channel A parity error
was detected during the countdown for the anticipated launch on July 24, 1991.
Data indicated that a hardware failure of the main engine controller had
occurred. As a result, the launch was scrubbed to allow replacement of the
controller, and the launch was rescheduled for August 1, 1991.
During the countdown for the anticipated launch on August 1, 1991, the
T-9 minute hold in the countdown was extended. The initial reason for the
extended hold was the lack of a closed indication from the cabin vent valve when
the cabin pressure check was completed. The vent valve was cycled several
additional times, but the closed indication was never received. A retest of the
cabin pressure integrity verified that the cabin-pressure vent-valve was closed,
and the vehicle was declared ready for launch.
Following the cabin pressure integrity retest, crosswinds at the return to
launch site (RTLS) Shuttle Landing Facility were exceeding the limits and the
T-9 minute hold was further extended. During this hold extension, the weather
conditions deteriorated at the launch site and the launch scheduled for August 1
was scrubbed. A recycle of 24 hours was executed.
The countdown for the August 2, 1991, launch proceeded smoothly. One problem
surfaced early in the countdown when the payload 2 multiplexer/demultiplexer
(MOM) bite status register bit 4 (unable to transfer data to/from the
input/output module) was set on both ports. Special KSC tests determined that
the serial digital input/output card 15 was not properly communicating with the
MOM's sequence control units. Since card 15 was not to be used on this MOM for
this mission, the decision was made to fly in the present configuration.
After auxiliary power unit (APU) 1 shutdown following ascent, the fuel pump/gas
generator valve module (GGVM) cooling system A indicated erratic water spraying
and also a slight overcooling of the APU fuel pump. This phenomenon was
observed on STS-37 and STS-38. This problem did not impact the mission.
Vater spray boiler (VSB) 2 did not cool lubrication oil following ascent. The
crew was requested to switch to the VSB B controller when APU 2
lubrication-oil-return temperature reached approximately 297 of.
Lubrication-oil-return temperature should be controlled to approximately 250 OF
by the VSB's. An extended flight control system (FCS) checkout using APU 2 was
performed on flight day 8 and VSB 2 did not coolon either controller A or B.
As a result, APU 2 was not activated until terminal area energy management
(TAEM) was reached about 7 minutes before landing.
A detailed review of film and video taken during ascent revealed that a section
of an engine dome blanket became detached from the area of SSME 1 and 2
approximately 43 seconds into the flight. Postflight inspection showed that the
blanket came from SSME 1. Thermal analysis indicated that no structural
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degradation from the detachment of the blanket occurred during ascent. Thermal
assessments indicated no concern with structural temperature conditions that
exist during entry, since entry heating is benign in the base-heat-shield area.
The TDRS-E payload was deployed at 214:19:16 G.m.t. A subsequent dual-engine,
payload-separation orbital maneuvering subsystem (OMS) maneuver was performed at
214:21:29:37 G.m.t. Performance was nominal during the 16.8-second maneuver,
which imparted a 6V of 31 ft/sec to the Orbiter.
Payload data interleaver (PDI) decommutator 2 ceased operating on format 7 and
decommutator 1 experienced intermittent data dropouts, resulting in data
processing problems for the SHARE-II payload. Processing of SHARE-II data was
switched to decommutator 3, and no further problem occurred with the SHARE-II
data processing for the remainder of the mission.
At the end of the first sleep period, the power reactant storage and
distribution (PRSD) hydrogen tank 1 heater B failed off. Pressure data verified
that only one heater was operational, and onboard troubleshooting showed that
heater B would not operate in either the automatic or manual mode. This anomaly
did not impact the mission.
Closed circuit television (CCTV) camera D was powered up, but no video output
was noted. Each time the camera was powered on, a camera over-temperature
message was received. The crew performed a camera recovery procedure with no
success, and the camera was declared inoperative for the remainder of the
mission. This anomaly did not impact the mission.
Subsequent to the deployment of the TDRS-E, video showed an object moving away
from the aft end of the Orbiter. A similar object was also noted during STS-41
and STS-35. The video of the object observed at TDRS-E/IUS deployment was
reviewed. The analysis indicated that the object was solid oxygen that was
dislodged from one of the main engine nozzles. This phenomenon has been seen on
previous flights. A postflight inspection showed that the object was not
Orbiter hardware or blankets.
Power amplifier 2 (PA2) exhibited decreasing output power in the low-frequency
mode until switchover to PAl prior to entry. At 221:19:00 G.m.t., S-Band PA2
began exhibiting erratic behavior. The power output increased from about 99
watts to 108 watts, then decreased again to about 99 watts. A few minutes
later, the output power again increased to 117 watts. PA2 continued to
oscillate between 99 watts and 117 watts. A switch from PA2 to PAl was made at
223:10:22:05 G.m.t., approximately 2 hours prior to landing, to ensure good
communications during entry. This anomaly did not impact the mission.
At 216:13:07:29 G.m.t., the Ku-Band power output indication dropped from the
nominal 31 watts to 7 watts, then 1 second later dropped to -22 watts. The
actual power output appeared to be satisfactory as the video being transmitted
at that time showed no degradation. The erratic behavior recurred three times
during the mission. This anomaly is believed to be the result of a failing
transducer.
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An abnormal current reading was detected on the mid-power control assembly
(MPCA) 3 bus during power-up of the payload bay floodlights. The current
readings indicated a possible problem with either the mid-starboard or the aft
port floodlight. As a result, a special payload-bay floodlight test was
performed at 222:06:45 G.m.t. The forward port and mid port floodlights
flickered and never fully illuminated. The aft port floodlight came up to full
illumination. The starboard floodlights were also turned on, with the forward
and aft starboard floodlights fully illuminating. The mid-starboard light never
came on and the remote power controller (RPC) tripped at floodlight activation.
All lights were turned off at 222:06:56 G.m.t. At payload-bay door closure, the
mid-port floodlight did illuminate fully.
At 222:12:27 G.m.t., the star tracker exhibited intermittent star presence while
pointed at the Sun with the shutter closed. This intermittent problem did not
affect the mission in any manner.
During presleep preparations at 220:18:20 G.m.t., the PRSD hydrogen manifold 1
isolation valve failed to close when commanded by the crew, and the valve failed
to respond on two subsequent attempts at closure. The valve was successfully
closed on five occasions earlier in the mission. The valve was left open for
the remainder of the mission. This anomaly did not affect the mission.
The FCS checkout was performed at 222:07:13:56.79 G.m.t., using APU 2, and the
checkout was extended to 11 minutes to verify WSB 2 operation. The FCS checkout
was satisfactory except that WSB 2 did not coolon either the A or B controller.
The lubrication-oil-return temperature had reached 307 of and the forward
bearing temperature had reached 340 OF when the APU was shut down. A total of
28 Ib of APU fuel was consumed during the FCS checkout. All other APU and WSB
parameters were nominal. Although the lubrication oil and bearing temperatures
were higher than usual, no limits were exceeded.
A satisfactory reaction control subsystem (RCS) hot-fire test was performed
after the FCS checkout. No thruster failures were noted. The RCS operated
nominally while interconnected to the left OMS.
The partial pressure oxygen sensor C data began to degrade late in the mission.
The C sensor is a backup to the A and B sensors and its data can only be
observed on the ground. The loss of these data had no effect on the successful
completion of the mission.
The payload bay doors were satisfactorily closed at 223:08:43:07.7 G.m.t. The
crew completed all planned experiment operations, as well as entry preparations
and stowage. The deorbit maneuver was performed at 223:11:21:14.97 G.m.t. The
maneuver was approximately 158.6 seconds in duration and the 6V was
307.0 ft/sec. Entry interface occurred at 223:11:51:51 G.m.t. Because of the
WSB 2 anomaly during ascent and FCS checkout, APU 2 was not activated until
223:12:16:57.71 G.m.t. (approximately 7 minutes before landing). During entry
for a 20- to 30-second period, the APU 1 chamber pressure did not return toa
zero level after each pulse, indicating a possible leak in the pulse control
valve. The anomalous operation did not affect entry operations.
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Main landing gear touchdown occurred at the Shuttle Landing Facility runway 15
at 223:12:23:25 G.m.t. (August 11, 1991). Nose landing gear touchdown occurred
10 seconds later with wheels stop at 223:12:24:24.96 G.m.t. The rollout was
normal in all respects. However, postflight data analysis showed that the
right-hand outboard brake pressure 4 measurement was biased about 200 psi lower
than the brake pressure 2 measurement. This anomaly did not affect the rollout
braking activities in any manner. The flight duration was 8 days 21 hours 22
minutes 25 seconds. APU 2 was shut down 1 minute 32 seconds
(223:12:24:57.22 G.m.t.) after touchdown, because of the YSB anomaly discussed
earlier in the report. The remaining 2 APU's were shut down by 223:12:45:16.85
G.m.t., and the crew completed the required postflight reconfigurations and
exited the Orbiter at 223:13:22:50 G.m.t.
A piece of metal, which was the ET umbilical stud yoke, was found on the runway
below the liquid oxygen umbilical plate area. In addition, the left-hand
inboard main landing gear tire was worn through two cords. This wear was on the
inboard side of the tire and appeared to be evenly spread around the
circumference of the tire. During postlanding leak checks, an audible leak was
found in the main propulsion system at the liquid hydrogen 4-inch disconnect. A
visual inspection of the disconnect showed that a piece of the valve flapper
seal had come loose and was lodged in the flapper. The anomalous seal movement
did not affect the mission in any manner.
VEHICLE PERFORMANCE
The vehicle performance section of this report contains a discussion of the
operation and performance of the major subsystems of the flight vehicle.
A determination of vehicle propulsion performance was made using vehicle
acceleration and preflight propulsion prediction data. From these data, the
average flight-derived engine specific impulse (Isp) determined for the time
period between SRB separation and start of 3-g throttling was 453.1 seconds as
compared to a fleet-average tag-value of 452.51 seconds. The relative velocity
of the vehicle reached the Adaptive Guidance/Throttling (AGT) reference value at
20.564 seconds, resulting in a calculated time difference of +0.5623 seconds.
SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS/REDESIGNED SOLID ROCKET MOTORS
All SRB systems performed as expected throughout ascent. The SRB prelaunch
countdown was normal. RSRM propulsion performance was well within the required
specification limits, and the propellant burn rate for each RSRM was normal.
RSRM thrust differentials during the build-up, steady-state, and tailoff phases
were well within specifications. All SRB thrust vector control (TVC) prelaunch
conditions and flight performance requirements were met with ample margins. All
electrical functions were performed properly. No SRB or RSRM Launch Commit
Criteria (LCC) or Operation and Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document (OMRSD) violations occurred during the countdown. One SRB in-flight
anomaly was identified during the postflight inspection.
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Power up and operation of all case, igniter, and field joint heaters were
accomplished routinely. All RSRM temperatures were maintained within acceptable
limits throughout the countdown. For this flight, the heated ground purge in
the SRB aft skirt was not required to maintain the case/nozzle joint and
flexible bearing temperatures within the required LCC ranges; however, the
heated purge was operated until the count was resumed following the T-9 minute
hold.
This was the second flight of RSRM's that contain propellant with Ammonium
Perchlorate that was procured from Western Electrochemical Corporation (WECCO).
Preliminary key RSRM propulsion performance parameters are presented in the
table on the following page.
The SRB flight structural temperature response was as expected. Postflight
inspection of the recovered hardware indicated that the SRB thermal protection
system (TPS) performed properly during ascent, with very little TPS acreage
ablation. Separation subsystem performance was normal, and all booster
separation motors (BSM's) were expended and all separation bolts were severed.
Nose cap jettison, frustum separation, and nozzle jettison occurred normally on
each SRB.
Both SRB's successfully separated from the ET near the proper time. The entry
and deceleration sequences were properly performed on both SRB's. RSRM nozzle
jettison occurred after frustum separation, and subsequent parachute deployments
were successfully performed. One of the left-SRB-main-parachute (no. 1) floats
became entangled in the aft skirt and had to be cut loose. As a result the
parachute sank and could not be recovered. The SRB's were recovered and
returned to KSC for disassembly and refurbishment.
During the postflight inspection, the left SRB holddown stud at post 7 hung up
during lift-off, resulting in broaching along the aft edge of the aft skirt hole
(on the inboard side) and thread impressions on the bore inside diameter (Flight
Problem STS-43-B-1). This hang-up did not affect the flight performance
of the vehicle. The broaching was very similar to that experienced on STS-51I.
The thread impressions experienced on STS-43 (the most severe recorded)
indicated severe lateral stud contact with the aft skirt holddown post, and this
contact resulted in a loss of energy and velocity. The primary cause of the
stud hang-up has been attributed to a skewed firing of the holddown post
pyrotechnics, with frangible nut rebound into the holddown stud as a secondary
contributor.
EXTERNAL TANK
All objectives and requirements associated with ET propellant loading and flight
operations were met, and the ET flight performance was excellent. All ET
electrical equipment and instrumentation performed satisfactorily. The
operation of the ET heaters and purges was monitored and all performed properly.
No LCC or OMRSD violations were identified.
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RSRM PROPULSION PERFORMANCE
Parameter
Impulse ga~es
I-20, 106 lbf-sec
I-60, 106 lbf-sec
I-AT, 10 Ibf-sec
Vacuum Isp, lbf-sec/lbm
Burn rate, in/sec (625 psia)
Event times, seconds
Ignition interval
Veb time
Action time
Separation command, seconds
PMBT, of
Maximum ignition rise rate,
psi/10 ms
Decay time, seconds
(59.4 psia to 85 K)
Left motor, 78 of Right motor, 78 of
Predicted Actual Predicted Actual
66.18 64.56 65.96 65.03
176.22 174.02 175.73 174.18
297.41 296.70 297.44 296.04
268.6 267.95 268.6 267.33
0.3724 0.3705 0.3716 0.3716
0.232 N/A 0.232 N/A
109.0 110.0 109.4 109.1
120.8 122.3 121.2 121.6
124.0 124.9 124.0 124.9
78.0 78.0 78.0 78.0
90.4 N/A 90.4 N/A
2.8 3.2 2.8 2.6
Tailoff imbalance
Impulse differential,
klbf-sec
Predicted
N/A
Actual
477 .0
Only normally expected ice/frost formations for the August atmospheric
environment were observed during the countdown. Normal quantities of ice or
frost were present on the liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen feedlines and on the
pressurization line brackets. No ice was observed on the acreage areas of the
ET. A small amount of frost was also present along the liquid hydrogen
protruding air load (PAL) ramps. All of these observations were acceptable
under existing Space Shuttle documentation. The ice/frost Red Team reported
that liquid air was observed for approximately 90 seconds coming from a crack or
void in the thermal protection subsystem (TPS) (liquid hydrogen umbilical area).
The observation was assessed and was determined to be a non-issue. There was no
acreage ice found on the ET, and TPS performance was as expected for the
existing ambient conditions.
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The ET pressurization system functioned properly throughout engine start and
flight. The minimum liquid oxygen ullage pressure experienced during the period
of the ullage pressure slump was 14.2 psid.
The ET tumble system was inactive for this flight and radar reports from Antigua
confirmed that the ET did not tumble. Main engine cutoff occurred within the
expected tolerances and ET entry and breakup was within the predicted footprint.
SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINE
All prelaunch operations associated with the SSME's were executed successfully.
Launch ground support equipment provided adequate control for the SSME's during
the launch countdown. All SSME parameters were normal throughout the prelaunch
countdown and compared very well with prelaunch parameters observed on previous
flights. The engine-ready indication was achieved at the proper time, and all
LCC were met.
Flight data indicate that SSME performance during engine start, thrust buildup
mainstage, throttling, shutdown, and propellant dump operations was within
specifications. All three engines started and operated normally. High pressure
oxidizer turbopump and high pressure fuel turbopump temperatures were normal
throughout engine operation. The SSME controllers provided proper control of
the engines throughout powered flight. Engine data generally compared well with
previous flight and test data. All on-orbit activities associated with the
SSME's were accomplished successfully.
During the countdown for the anticipated launch on July 24, 1991, the SSME 3
controller went to halt when an unrecoverable channel A parity error was
detected (Flight Problem STS-43-E-1) prior to the start of liquid oxygen
replenish. Data indicated that a hardware failure of the main engine controller
had occurred. As a result, the launch was scrubbed to allow replacement of the
controller, and the launch was rescheduled for August 1, 1991. The failure
analysis of the controller revealed a broken blind lap solder joint connection
of the bit jumper to the half stack, which is not a generic design problem.
SHUTTLE RANGE SAFETY SYSTEM
The Shuttle range safety system (SRSS) closed-loop testing was completed as
scheduled during the launch countdown. The SRSS safe and arm (S&A) devices were
armed and all system inhibits were turned off at the appropriate times. All
SRSS measurements indicated that the system performed as expected throughout the
flight with the SRSS signal strength remaining above the specified minimum of
-97 dBm for the flight duration.
Prior to SRB separation, the SRB S&A devices were safed, and SRB system power
was turned off, as planned. The ET system remained active until ET separation
from the Orbiter.
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ORBITER VEHICLE SUBSYSTEMS
Main Propulsion System
The overall performance of the main propulsion system (MPS) was excellent.
All pretanking purges were properly performed, and liquid oxygen and liquid
hydrogen loading was performed as planned with no stop-flows or reverts. No
OMRSD violations occurred.
Throughout the preflight operations, no significant hazardous gas concentrations
were detected, and the maximum hydrogen level in the Orbiter aft compartment was
130 ppm, which is well within the historical boundaries for this vehicle. A
hydrogen leak was detected in the ground carrier umbilical plate assembly. The
leak was within limits and did not pose a constraint to launch. A comparison of
the calculated propellant loads at the end of replenish versus the inventory
loads resulted in a loading accuracy of +0.04 percent for liquid hydrogen and
-0.012 for liquid oxygen.
Ascent MPS performance appeared to be completely normal. Data indicate that the
liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen pressurization systems performed as planned
and that all net positive suction pressure requirements were met throughout the
flight.
STS-43 was the second flight of the Shuttle Program and the first flight of the
OV-104 vehicle to use the gaseous oxygen fixed-orifice flow control valve which
was shimmed to a target position corresponding to a 78 percent flow area. The
gaseous oxygen pressurization system performed normally throughout the entire
flight. All ullage pressures corresponded well with preflight predictions.
Feed system performance was normal, and liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen
propellant conditions were within specified limits during all phases of
operation. Propellant dump and vacuum inerting were accomplished
satisfactorily.
A detailed review of film and video taken during ascent revealed that a section
of an engine dome blanket became detached from the area near SSME 1 and SSME 2
approximately 43 seconds into the flight. The postflight inspection showed that
the material had come from around SSME 1. The OV-104 vehicle has the original
S-glass-type blanket design, which has shown degradation on almost every flight.
Thermal analysis indicated that no structural degradation from the detachment of
the blanket occurred during ascent. Thermal assessments also indicated no
concern with structural over-temperature conditions that exist during entry,
since entry heating is benign in the base heat shield area.
Subsequent to the deployment of the TDRS-E, video showed an object moving away
from the aft end of the Orbiter. A similar object was also reported during
STS-41 and STS-35. The video of the object observed at TDRS-E/IUS deployment
was reviewed. Data showed that the main propulsion system contained 3869 Ib of
liquid oxygen at ET separation. Of this amount, 3400 Ib was vented through the
engine nozzles. Below -360 of, oxygen solidifies and accumulates on the
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nozzles. The analysis indicated that the object was solid oxygen that was
dislodged from one of the main engine nozzles. This phenomenon has been seen on
previous flights. A postflight inspection did not reveal any missing Orbiter
hardware or blankets.
The helium system performed nominally during ascent and entry; however, after
manifold repressurization during entry, a helium leak was detected around the
4-inch disconnect. The postlanding inspection revealed an audible leak that was
caused by a piece of the seal (1.2 inch by 0.13 inch) being lodged in the
flapper of the 4-inch disconnect valve (Flight Problem STS-43-V-13). A similar
problem was encountered on a STS-26 mission. A piece of the material was sent
to a laboratory at KSC for analysis. The anomalous seal movement did not affect
the successful completion of the mission.
During the postflight inspection, an Orbiter lightning strip epoxy bead was
found loose on the 17-inch umbilical. This condition has occurred on a number
of past Shuttle missions.
The postflight data review confirmed that the right SSME (3) liquid oxygen inlet
pressure increased to 33 psia after repressurization and tracked the manifold
pressure instead of following the ambient pressure during entry (Flight Problem
STS-43-V-16). The analysis is continuing in an effort to explain the cause of
this anomaly.
Reaction Control Subsystem
The RCS performance was nominal throughout the mission with 4749 lb of
propellarit consumed plus 1.95 percent of OMS propellant used by the RCS when
interconnected to the OMS. The RCS was used during entry to support development
test objective (DTO) 248 [Forward RCS Flight Test (8-Second Pulse)] which
required two 8-second pulses.
The update configuration of onboard software incorporated the primary thruster
alternate digital autopilot (DAP) mode. Because of the need to conserve forward
RCS propellant, the alternate DAP mode was used as an operational program in
addition to the DTO activities. The evaluation of the alternate DAP mode as an
operational program shows that approximately 25 lb of RCS propellant were saved
while using this mode.
Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
The OMS performed nominally during the three planned maneuvers (OMS-2, OMS-3,
and deorbit maneuver). A total of 12,678 lb of propellants was consumed by the
OMS during the three maneuvers and the two periods of interconnect operations
with the RCS during which approximately 1.95 percent of OMS propellant was used
by the RCS.
The only problem noted was that both the left and right forward fuel probes read
high during the mission. The left probe has been failed for several missions as
it indicates off-scale high. The right probe began indicating erroneously
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during the OMS-2 maneuver. The probe continued to provide an input into the
totalizer during the deorbit maneuver when the forward compartment was empty.
This caused a 16 to 18 percent offset in the right total fuel quantity after the
deorbit maneuver. Both of these conditions were known prior to the mission and
waivers had been written against the hardware.
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Subsystem
The four-tank-set PRSD subsystem satisfactorily met all requirements throughout
the mission. A total of 2186 lb of oxygen and 266 lb of hydrogen were consumed
during the mission. The crew consumed 76.9 lb of oxygen. Adequate consumables
(687 lb of usable oxygen and 79 lb of usable hydrogen) remained at the end of
the mission for an additional 63 hours of operation at an average power level of
14.4 kW. Two anomalies were identified and are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
At the end of the first sleep period (215:09:40 G.m.t.), the PRSD hydrogen tank
1 heater B failed off (Flight Problem STS-43-V-04). Pressure data verified that
only heater A was operational, and troubleshooting showed that heater B would
not operate in either the automatic or manual mode. This anomaly did not impact
the mission. The cryogenics management plan was changed to deplete hydrogen
tank 1 to a level that ensured a full mission duration should heater A in
hydrogen tank 1 also fail. Postflight troubleshooting revealed an open 5-ampere
fuse in the heater controller. In an effort to determine the cause of the open
fuse, further troubleshooting is being performed.
During presleep preparations at 220:18:09 G.m.t., the PRSD hydrogen manifold 1
isolation valve failed to close when commanded by the crew, and the valve failed
to respond on two subsequent attempts at closure (Flight Problem STS-43-V-09).
Pressure data confirmed that the valve had failed in the open position. The
valve had been successfully closed on five occasions earlier in the mission.
The valve was left open for the remainder of the mission, and during postlanding
operations the valve was cycled five times successfully. Leaving this valve
open prevented fuel cell 1 from being isolated to tank 1, had a leak occurred.
Tank 1 was intentionally depleted to a low quantity because of the heater B
failure in that tank. This anomaly did not affect the mission.
Fuel Cell Powerplant Subsystem
The fuel cell powerplant subsystem performed satisfactorily throughout the
213-hour mission. The fuel cells produced 3062 kWh of electricity at an average
power level of 14.4 kW and load of 469 amperes. The fuel cells consumed 266 lb
of hydrogen and 2109 lb of oxygen and produced 2375 lb of water in addition to
the electricity produced.
One minor problem was noted during the mission. After the payload separation
maneuver that followed the deployment of the TDRS-E payload, the pressure
sensors on the fuel cell 2 alternate water line exhibited an increased reading
simultaneous with a temperature rise to the 100 to 105 OF temperature range,
both of which were indicative of some water from fuel cell 2 entering the
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alternate water line. This temperature signature could not be correlated with
any events or equipment usage that would affect the local thermal environment of
the sensor.
A postlanding incident occurred after the Orbiter had been moved to the Orbiter
Processing Facility (OPF) when an emergency power down of the fuel cells was
required. This resulted from Helium ingestion into fuel cells 2 and 3 from the
ground support equipment (GSE). The Helium entered through the oxygen hori-
zontal drain disconnect while the console operator was performing calibrations
of the GSE back-pressure regulator. The GSE Helium pressure exceeded the
20-psid limit across the disconnect, and a severe voltage drop-off was observed
in fuel cells 2 and 3.
As a result, an emergency power down of the fuel cells was performed at
224:22:11 G.m.t. This type of shutdown deactivates all heaters and pumps;
however, the fuel cell can still produce power. Fuel cells 2 and 3 did not have
enough voltage to drive their respective power connector motors, which remove
and connect the fuel cells to the voltage bus. As a result, the fuel cells
still had a load applied and may have produced water. Flooding of fuel cells 2
and 3 may have occurred because the hydrogen pumps that remove the water were
not operating and there was no way to remove the water from the fuel cells.
These two fuel cells were removed and sent to the fuel cell vendor for analysis.
Auxiliary Power Unit Subsystem
The APU subsystem met all demands placed upon the subsystem, but three anomalies
and a number of other problems, none of which impacted the mission, were noted
during the mission. The following table presents the cumulative run time and
fuel consumption for the APU's during the STS-43 mission.
APU 1 (SIN 305) APU 2 (SIN 208) APU 3 (SIN 307)
Flight Phase Time, Fuel Time, Fuel Time, Fuel
min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption, min:sec consumption,
lb lb lb
Ascent 00:20:08 49 00:20:06 57 00:20:03 54
FCS checkout 00:11:04 26
Entry 01:28:57 176 00:08:00 21 01:24:02 152
a 01:49:05 225 00:39:10 104 01:44:05 206Total
a The total includes 21 minutes 51 seconds of APU 1 and 3 operation and 1 minute
32 seconds of APU 2 operation after landing.
After APU 1 shutdown following ascent, the fuel pump/GGVM cooling system A
displayed erratic water spray pulses. These longer pulses resulted in erratic
APU fuel pump temperatures (Flight Problem STS-43-V-06). The controlling
circuit has a timer that should limit water spraying to 1-second pulses;
however, pulses as long as 9 seconds were observed in the data. These longer
pulses were observed on at least six other flights of this vehicle with
different APU's.
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The second problem identified on APU 1 was indicated by the low temperature
spikes seen in the data. These spikes are indicative of water spraying directly
onto the fuel pump temperature sensor. This same temperature trace was observed
on this APU when operating on another vehicle, and therefore is believed to be
unique to this APU and its spray manifold.
The APU 1 drain line temperature appeared to change its set point immediately
prior to switching to the B heaters, but it remained within acceptable limits.
Operation was satisfactory on the B heaters.
The FCS checkout was performed at 222:07:13:56.79 G.m.t., using APU 2, and
checkout was extended to 11 minutes to verify WSB 2 operation. The FCS checkout
was satisfactory except that YSB 2 did not coolon either the A or B controller.
The APU lubrication oil return temperature had reached 307 OF and the APU
forward bearing temperature had reached 340 of when the APU was shut down. A
total of 26 lb of APU fuel was consumed during the FCS checkout. All other APU
parameters were nominal. Although the lubrication oil and bearing temperatures
were higher than usual, no limits were exceeded.
About 1 hour prior to the deorbit maneuver, the APU 2 drain pressure 1 exceeded
the 25-psia fault detection annunciator (FDA) limit. A table maintenance block
update (TMBU) was transmitted to raise the FDA limit to 27 psia. The drain
pressure did not exceed the recently established limit during the remainder of
the flight.
Because of the YSB 2 anomaly during ascent and FCS checkout, APU 2 was not
activated until 223:12:16:57.71 G.m.t. (at the start of the TAEM phase about
7 minutes prior to landing). One procedural problem was noted during APU 2
shutdown when the controller was shut down prior to the completion of APU
spin-down.
For about a 35-second period during entry, the APU 1 chamber pressure returned
to a non-zero level after each pulse, indicating a possible leak in the pulse
control valve (Flight Problem STS-43-V-12). Time between pulses became erratic
and turbine speed decay rate during valve-closed periods appeared to decrease.
Both chamber pressure and turbine speed recovered after about 35 seconds and
remained nominal for the remainder of entry and landing operations.
Hydraulics/Yater Spray Boiler Subsystem
The hydraulics/water spray boiler subsystem performance during the mission was
acceptable; however, YSB 2 failed to provide cooling to APU 2 throughout the
mission. Circulation pump operation was satisfactory on all three hydraulics
systems.
Yater spray boiler 2 did not cool lubrication oil using controller A following
ascent (Flight Problem STS-43-V-02). The crew was requested to switch to the
YSB controller B when APU 2 lubrication oil return temperature reached
approximately 297 OF. Lubrication oil return temperature should be controlled
to approximately 250 OF by the WSB's. The APU's were operated an additional
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1.5 minutes while on the B controller, but no evidence of cooling was observed
on APU 2 and the APU's were shut down. The APU 2 lubrication oil return
temperature had reached 323 of at APU shutdown.
An extended FCS checkout was performed at 222:07:13:56.79 G.m.t., using APU 2,
and the checkout was extended to 11 minutes to verify WSB 2 operation. The FCS
checkout was satisfactory except that WSB 2 did not coolon either the A or B
controller. The lubrication-oil-return temperature had reached 307 OF and the
forward bearing temperature had reached 340 of when the APU was shut down. All
WSB parameters were nominal. Although the lubrication oil and bearing
temperatures were higher than usual, no limits were exceeded. Data analysis is
underway and a failure of the lubrication oil spray valve (electrical or
mechanical) is suspected. As a result, the flight rule which covers loss of a
WSB and requires the associated APU not be activated until TAEM (about 7 minutes
before landing) was followed.
Pyrotechnics Subsystem
The pyrotechnics subsystem operated satisfactorily throughout the mission with
no anomalies identified.
Environmental Control and Life Support Subsystem
The environmental control and life support subsystem (ECLSS) performed
satisfactorily throughout the mission with one prelaunch anomaly and one
in-flight anomaly, neither of which impacted the completion of the mission in
any manner.
The atmospheric revitalization subsystem (ARS) performance was nominal and all
in-flight checkout requirements were completed satisfactorily. The air and
water coolant loops performed nominally, and the carbon dioxide partial pressure
was maintained below 3.6 mm Hg. The cabin air temperature and relative humidity
peaked at 82 OF and 50 percent, respectively. The avionics bays 1, 2, and 3 air
outlet temperatures peaked at 104 of, 107 of, and 89 of, respectively, whereas
the avionics bays 1, 2, and 3 water coldplate temperatures peaked at 88 of,
90 of, and 82 of, respectively.
During the countdown for the anticipated August 1, 1991, launch, the T-9 minute
hold in the countdown was extended because of the lack of a closed indication
(barberpole indication remained) from the cabin vent valve when the cabin
pressure check was completed (Flight Problem STS-43-V-01). The vent valve was
cycled several additional times, but the closed indication was never received.
A retest of the cabin pressure integrity verified that the cabin pressure vent
valve was closed, and the vehicle was declared ready for launch. The lack of a
closed indication was not a LCC violation since it was proven that the vent
valve was actually closed.
Late in the mission, the partial pressure oxygen sensor C data began to drift
lower by 0.02 psia every 3 to 6 minutes (Flight Problem STS-43-V-11). Until the
drift was noted, the sensor had remained within 0.02 to 0.04 psia of the A and B
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sensors. The C sensor is a backup to the A and B sensors and its data can only
been seen on the ground. The discrepancies in these data did not affect the
successful completion of the mission.
Supply Water, Waste Water and Waste Collection Subsystems
The supply water and waste management subsystems performed normally throughout
the mission. All of the associated in-flight checkout requirements were
performed and satisfied by the end of the mission.
Supply water was managed through the use of the overboard dump system and the
flash evaporator system. Two supply water dumps were performed at an average
dump rate of 1.7 percent/minute (2.8 lb/min). The supply water dump line
temperature was maintained between 66 of and 93 of throughout the mission with
the operation of the line heaters.
Waste water was gathered at about the predicted rate. Four waste water dumps
were performed at an average dump rate of 1.9 percent/minute. The waste water
dump line temperature was maintained between 56 of and 75 of throughout the
mission, while the vacuum vent line temperature was maintained between 58 of and
76 of.
The waste collection system (WCS) performed normally throughout the mission.
The vacuum vent quick disconnect on the WCS was satisfactorily used to vent the
lower body negative pressure device [detailed supplementary objective (DSO) 478]
each time the device was used.
Smoke Detection and Fire Suppression Subsystems
The smoke detection system performance was nominal during the mission, and no
use of the fire suppression system was required.
Airlock Support System
All airlock parameters remained nominal, indicating normal performance
throughout the mission. The airlock was not used during the mission for other
than a stowage area.
Avionics and Software Subsystem
The integrated guidance, navigation, and control system performed nominally
throughout the mission. Three DTO's were performed using the integrated
guidance, navigation, and control system. These were:
a. DTO 309 - Ascent Flutter Boundary Evaluation
b. DTO 798 - Alternate Mode Digital Autopilot Performance Evaluation
c. DTO 248 - Forward RCS Flight Test (8-second pulse)
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To conserve fuel usage, a real-time decision was made to use the alternate mode
digital autopilot (with 1 tail thruster only) as an operational tool. This
configuration worked well and resulted in a forward RCS fuel savings of
approximately 25 lb.
The inertial measurement units operated satisfactorily. The star tracker
subsystem performance was satisfactory, although the -Z star tracker
intermittently indicated star presence with the shutter closed (Flight Problem
STS-43-V-15). The shutter is suspected of not being fully closed. The anomaly
did not impact orbital operations, nor was it any hazard to the star tracker.
The data processing system/flight software performance was satisfactory. The
electrical power and distribution control (EPDC) subsystem also operated
satisfactorily. All data that was analyzed has shown nominal voltage and
current signatures, and no specified limits were violated.
The displays and control subsystem met all operational requirements; however, an
abnormal current reading (15 ampere increase in 3 to 4 seconds) was detected on
the MPCA 3 bus during power-up of the payload bay floodlights. The current
readings indicated a possible problem with either the mid-starboard or the aft
port floodlight. As a result, a special payload bay floodlight test was
performed at 222:06:45 G.m.t. The forward port and mid port floodlights
flickered and never fully illuminated. The aft port floodlight came up to full
illumination. The starboard floodlights were also turned on, with the forward
and aft starboard floodlights fully illuminating. The mid-starboard light never
came on and the RPC tripped at floodlight activation (Flight Problem
STS-43-V-10). All lights were turned off at 222:06:56 G.m.t. At payload bay
door closure, the mid-port floodlight did illuminate fully.
Communications and Tracking Subsystem
The communications and tracking subsystem performed acceptably; however, three
anomalies and one problem were noted during the mission. The communications and
tracking subsystem was used to successfully perform DTO 700-1 (TDRS S-Band Low
Power) and DTO 799 (PGSC/PADM Air/Ground Communications Demonstration).
CCTV camera D was powered up, but no video output was noted (Flight Problem
STS-43-V-05). Each time the camera was powered on, a camera over-temperature
message was received. The crew performed a camera recovery procedure with no
success, and the camera was declared inoperative for the remainder of the
mission. This anomaly did not impact the mission.
CCTV camera A has the ground test pattern burned into the tube; this pattern was
only visible during low-level light operations. This problem did not interfere
with low-light operations nor the mission.
Power amplifier 2 exhibited a decreasing power output throughout the mission and
PAl was selected just before entry (Flight Problem STS-43-V-08). The traveling
wave tube in PA2 was approaching its normal operating life of 2000 hours and was
showing signs of degradation. At 221:19:00 G.m.t., S-Band PA2 began exhibiting
erratic behavior.
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The power output increased from about 99 watts to 108 watts, then decreased
again to about 99 watts. A few minutes later, the output power increased to
117 watts. PA2 continued to oscillate between 99 watts and 117 watts. A
decision was made by the flight controllers to switch from PA2 to PAl at
223:10:22:05 G.m.t., approximately 2 hours prior to landing. The change to PAl
was made because of erratic communications and as a precautionary measure to
ensure good communications during entry. This anomaly did not impact the
mission.
At 216:13:07:29 G.m.t., the Ku-Band power output indication dropped from the
nominal 31 watts to 7 watts, then 1 second later dropped to -22 watts (Flight
Problem STS-43-V-07). The actual power output appeared to be satisfactory as
the video being transmitted at that time showed no degradation. This same
indication was present in three of the Ku-Band modes of operation. About
32 minutes after the initial indication, Ku-Band power returned to the normal
level of 31 watts. The quality of TV transmission at the time of the low
indications has remained good; therefore, the problem is not an indication of
actual power degradation. This problem recurred two additional times later in
the mission and neither indicated an actual decrease in output power. This
anomaly is believed to be the result of a failing transducer.
The crew reported that the quality of voice on the flight deck speaker was very
poor as compared to the middeck speaker. The crew reported that the speaker
sometimes produced noises that were unintelligible. This speaker will be
replaced during turnaround operations.
Operational Instrumentation
The operational instrumentation performed satisfactorily; however, one anomaly
was identified. Following TDRS-E deployment, the PDI decommutator 2 ceased
operating on format 7 and operations on decommutator 1 experienced intermittent
dropouts, resulting in data processing problems for the SHARE II payload (Flight
Problem STS-43-V-03). Processing of SHARE-II data was switched to decommutator
3, and the problem did not affect the SHARE-II data processing for the remainder
of the mission.
Structures and Mechanical Subsystem
The structures and mechanical subsystem performed nominally except for the left
inboard main landing gear tire which was worn through two cords. This wear was
on the inboard side of the tire and appeared to be evenly spread around the
circumference of the tire. This type of wear is not unusual for landings at
KSC.
Main landing gear touchdown occurred at the Shuttle Landing Facility runway 15
at 223:12:23:25 G.m.t. (7:23:25 a.m. e.d.t. on August 11, 1991) at a ground
speed of 203.4 knots, and 1986 ft from the runway threshold. Nose landing gear
touchdown occurred 10 seconds later at a speed of 166.6 knots 5517 ft from the
runway threshold. Wheels stop occurred at 223:12:24:24.96 G.m.t. The rollout
was 9890 ft based on Orbiter data, and the rollout was normal in all respects.
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The sink rate at main gear touchdown was approximately 2.0 ft/sec, and the pitch
rate at nose gear touchdown was 2.36 "deg/sec. The Orbiter weight at landing was
196,046.5 lb.
The maximum brake pressures during rollout ranged from 840 to 936 psi on the
left main gear and 780 to 1008 psi on the right main gear. Brake energies were
24.04 million ft-Ib on the left-hand outboard brake, 27.21 million ft-Ib on the
left-hand inboard brake, 31.96 million ft-Ib on the right-hand inboard brake and
27.62 million ft-Ib on the right-hand outboard brake. Postflight data analysis
showed that the right-hand outboard brake pressure 4 measurement was biased
about 200 psi lower than the brake pressure 2 measurement (Flight Problem
STS-43-V-14).
Aerodynamics and Heating
The overall aerodynamics performance of the Orbiter during STS-43 was
satisfactory; however, the ascent trajectory flown provided a maximum dynamic
pressure greater than 750 psf, which is higher than normally experienced.
The entry aerodynamics were as expected. In general, the control surfaces
responded as expected, and the angle of attack was as predicted. DTO 248 was
performed during entry with two 8-second pulses being input to the system. The
aerodynamics appeared nominal as a result of the inputs for DTO 248.
Ascent and entry aerodynamic heating was nominal based on heating calculations
and the postflight inspection.
Thermal Control Subsystem
The performance of the thermal control subsystem was nominal during all phases
of the mission. All temperatures were maintained within acceptable limits.
Aerothermodynamics
The aero thermodynamic performance of the vehicle was satisfactory. Acreage
heating was nominal, and all structural temperatures remained within limits.
The angle of attack was 39 degrees for a large portion of the trajectory and
this value is within the experience base of the Space Shuttle Program. Local
acreage heating was nominal with no tile melting indicated.
Thermal Protection Subsystem
The TPS performance was nominal, based on structural temperature response, and
some tile surface temperature measurements. The overall boundary layer
transition from laminar flow to turbulent flow was nominal-to-late, occurring
between 1270 and 1290 seconds after entry interface. These times are the latest
boundary layer transition times recorded on flights with available
instrumentation (22 of 42 flights).
The KSC infrared imager was used to measure the surface temperatures in several
areas of the Orbiter. At 84 minutes after landing, the Orbiter nose cap
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reusable carbon carbon (RCC) temperature was 113 of, the right wing leading edge
RCC panel 9 was 92 of, and the right wing panel 17 was 91°F.
Debris impact damage was minimal. The postflight inspection of the Orbiter
revealed a total of 131 hits on the tile surface, 25 of which were greater than
1 inch. Four tile removals and replacements were identified as a result of
debris impacts. The largest single damage site on the Orbiter lower surface
occurred on the right-hand nose area below the forward RCS module. The damage
site measured 18 in. by 1 in. by 1/8 in. (spanned six tiles) and was repairable.
This damage may have resulted from the loss of TPS from the ET intertank area.
Postflight analysis of ET post-separation photographs, taken by the crew for
DTO 312, will be performed.
A cluster of 19 hits (seven larger than 1 in.) occurred immediately forward of
the liquid oxygen ET/Orbiter umbilical cavity. Similar clusters of hits have
been observed in this area on previous flights and have been attributed to ice
from the liquid oxygen feedline bellows or support brackets. A second cluster
of 12 hits (4 larger than 1 in.) occurred immediately aft of the liquid oxygen
ET/Orbiter umbilical cavity and has been attributed to ice from the liquid
oxygen ET/Orbiter umbilical during ET separation and/or damage from the purge
barrier baggie and ice during ascent.
Inspection showed no significant heat intrusion past the thermal barriers around
the ET doors. No TPS damage was attributed to material from wheels, tires, or
brakes. Damage to the base heat shield tiles was less than average. The outer
layer of the S5ME 3 closeout blanket was peeled back along a 12-inch length at
the 10 o'clock position. Minor fraying also occurred along a 12-inch length at
the 9 o'clock position. The outer layer of the SSME 1 closeout blanket was
frayed along a 12-inch length at the 8 o'clock location. The SSME 1 closeout
blanket (approximately 40 inches in length) may have been the white object that
was observed in films as falling aft of the Orbiter 43 seconds after launch.
Performance of the upper inboard elevon TPS material was excellent. The overall
condition of the TPS on the OMS pods was good. White streaks were present on
the right-wing leading edge RCC panels and appeared to be similar to the streaks
observed on previous flights. The upper fuselage, payload bay doors, and upper
wing TPS performance was nominal.
The nose landing gear door TPS was in good condition with only minor fraying.
The forward RCS plume shield barriers showed evidence of damage. The left-hand
barrier was protruding and severely frayed. A piece of thermal barrier
approximately 8 inches in length was missing from between thrusters F2R and F4D
on the right side of the forward RCS module. The barrier most probably came off
'late in the entry trajectory because no evidence is overheating was present.
The left-hand main landing gear door outboard thermal barrier was torn in the
area adjacent to the forward hinge. The right-hand forward outboard corner tile
was broken. The aft edge thermal barrier was protruding. The elevon-elevon gap
tiles were in good condition, with minor gap filler degradation.
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Overall, the RCC parts appeared nominal, except for the chin panel inspection
that revealed internal damage to some lug areas of the panel and expansion seal.
This damage was caused by a contact between clevis bolts and the panel.
Although the drawing specifies a clearance of 0.10 inch between the bolt and RCC
parts, contact between these parts occurred because of a discrepancy in the
installation process (shim or spacer not installed).
The engine-mounted heat shield thermal curtain was damaged on SSME 1 with
blanket batting missing between 4 and 6 o'clock. This material was probably the
debris seen on the ascent films at 43 seconds into the flight. All other engine
blankets exhibited normal flight damage.
No tiles, carrier panels, or other TPS materials were missing from the Orbiter
that would explain the object observed on-orbit after the TDRS-E/IUS deployment.
Frozen oxygen from the SSME area is the most likely explanation for that object.
Orbiter windows 3 and 4 exhibited heavy hazing with a few small streaks.
Windows 1, 2, 5, and 6 had a slight hazing with several small streaks.
FLIGHT CREW EQUIPMENT
The flight crew equipment performed flawlessly throughout the STS-43 mission.
PAYLOADS
TRACKING AND DATA RELAY SATELLITE/INERTIAL UPPER STAGE
STS-43 deployed the fifth of six TDRS-E/IUS communications spacecraft into
orbit. The TDRS-E is in geosynchronous orbit over the Pacific Ocean where it
will provide telecommunications services for the Space Shuttle and unmanned
satellites.
AURORAL PHOTOGRAPHY EXPERIMENT-B
The Auroral Photography Experiment (APE) -B objective was to provide photography
for the study of the Earth's auroras. Five planned data takes were completed
after performing an in-flight maintenance procedure to overcome a missing piece
of hardware. A sixth data take was to be redundant photography of the Orbiter
surfaces. The five data takes were considered to have fulfilled 100 percent of
the mission requirements.
BIOSERVE-INSTRUMENTATION TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATES MATERIALS DISPERSION APPARATUS
The Bioserve-Instrumentation Technology Associates Materials Dispersion
Apparatus (BIMDA) objective was to grow large protein crystals in the weightless
environment. The on-orbit processing activities of the BIMDA bioprocessing
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modules and material dispersion apparatus were accomplished with no problems,
although some difficulties were experienced with cell syringe leakage. This
leaking resulted in only non-toxic substances being spilled from all six
syringes. In spite of the leakage difficulties, approximately 90 percent of the
preflight scientific objectives of the experiment were accomplished.
INVESTIGATIONS INTO POLYMER MEMBRANE PROCESSING
The objective of the Investigations Into Polymer Membrane Processing (IPMP)
experiment was to manufacture polymers in orbit. The IPMP payload required a
minimum of 24 hours of operation before entry to meet its objectives. The
experiment was powered on during flight day 6, approximately 96 hours prior to
entry and was turned off before entry. Scientific results will be reported
after the sponsor's evaluation.
AIR FORCE MAUl OPTICAL SITE
The objective of the Air Force Maui Optical Site (AMOS) experiment was for the
Orbiter to serve as a calibration target for ground-based electro-optical
sensors. No flight hardware was required for this payload. The AMOS payload
accomplished all of its planned objectives on this flight: two passive Orbiter
over-flights and two Orbiter RCS tests. All passes were very successful. The
only problem encountered concerned an infrared sensor on the ground that was
apparently not sensitive enough to acquire the Orbiter.
ULTRAVIOLET PLUME INSTRUMENT
The objective of the Ultraviolet Plume Instrument (UVPI) was to use the Orbiter
as a calibration target for space-based ultraviolet sensors. No flight hardware
was required for this payload. No UVPI observation opportunities were
identified either preflight or in real-time for this payload.
PROTEIN CRYSTAL GROYTH-III
The objective of the Protein Crystal Growth (PCG)-III experiment was to grow
crystals in the microgravity environment. The PCG payload was activated early
on flight day 1 and operated for the entire mission (minimum on-orbit operation
required was 4 days). The only anomaly involved a temperature variation on
flight day 3, when the automatic temperature control allowed the PCG
temperature to decrease to 18°C. The temperature control was reset to the 23
°C position and satisfactory temperature control was maintained thereafter. The
customer stated that this variation is not expected to significantly effect
crystal growth. The scientific results will be known after the experiment's
sponsor has evaluated the data.
SHUTTLE ACCELERATION MEASUREMENT SYSTEM
The objective of the Shuttle Acceleration Measurement System (SAMS) was to
measure accelerations and disturbances in the weightless environment on-orbit.
The SAMS payload operated throughout the entire mission, and for,the first time,
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gathered data in the Orbiter middeck for its assigned objectives. The sensors
on this flight were mounted on the Solid Surface Combustion Experiment (SSCE)
and the PCG payloads and also on the treadmill. The amount of data lost during
the flight day 8 data recording anomaly is uncertain, but in the worst case, it
is expected to be only 4 or 5 hours.
SOLID SURFACE COMBUSTION EXPERIMENT
The objective of the SSCE was to investigate how materials burn in
weightlessness. The SSCE payload objectives were successfully accomplished
when the experiment was performed on flight day 6. The scientific results of
this experiment will be known following postflight evaluation of the experiment
results by the sponsors.
SPACE STATION HEAT PIPE ADVANCED RADIATOR ELEMENT II
The objective of the SHARE-II was to demonstrate microgravity thermal vacuum
performance of a heat pipe radiator for heat rejection as a prelude to the
development of a Space Station heat rejection system. The SHARE-II experiment
was successfully operated with approximately 200 percent of the experiment's
objectives being completed. Of the six data takes planned preflight, all were
completely successful. In real-time, six additional data takes were arranged to
further investigate the heat pipes capabilities under circumstances greatly
exceeding nominal conditions. The evolving experiment plan provided extended
opportunities to demonstrate microgravity thermal vacuum performance of the heat
pipe radiators to the fullest extent.
SHUTTLE SOLAR BACKSCATTER ULTRAVIOLET
The objective of the SSBUV payload was to calibrate ultraviolet sensors for
TIROS-N and Nimbus-7 satellites. The SSBUV completed all planned objectives for
the STS-43 mission: 33 orbits of earth viewing planned and accomplished (minimum
of 24 required - 32 desired); and four solar views and four calibrations planned
and accomplished (three required). All operations appear to be nominal.
Scientific results will not be available until the sponsor evaluates the data.
OPTICAL COMMUNICATIONS THROUGH THE SHUTTLE VINDOV
The objective of the Optical Communications Through the Shuttle Vindow (OCTV)
was to demonstrate fiber-optic communications onboard the Shuttle. A number of
configuration problems were encountered during the initial setup for the
payload. Once these were resolved, all four planned tests were accomplished for
OCTV.
TANK PRESSURE CONTROL EXPERIMENT
The objective of the
the effectiveness of
fluid temperatures.
nominally. The TPCE
Tank Pressure Control Experiment (TPCE) was to determine
jet mixing for controlling tank pressures and equilibrating
The TPCE payload is assumed to have operated completely
was activated by a baroswitch during ascent and was
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deactivated after approximately 49 hours of operation (36 hours required to
perform the 38 sequential test runs). The desired attitudes were also planned
and accomplished. The scientific results will not be known until the sponsor
evaluates the data.
PHOTOGRAPHIC AND TELEVISION ANALYSIS
LAUNCH VIDEOS AND FILMS
On launch day, all 25 of the expected video were screened. Three significant
observations were made. A discoloration was noted in the SSME 2 plume shortly
after engine start. Also, a debonding of a beta blanket around SSME 2 was noted
during engine start. The third observation was a piece of debris that was seen
on several long-range tracking cameras falling aft of the vertical stabilizer at
approximately 43 seconds after lift-off.
In addition, all 71 of the expected launch films were reviewed. Significant
observations included the same observations as noted in the videos plus a stud
hang-up on holddown post M7 of the left SRB at lift-off.
Eight discolorations were noted in the SSME 2 plume Mach diamond prior to
lift-off. The color of the plume appeared to change from blue to an orange
tint. A similar discoloration was observed in the STS-32 photography. Analysis
of these discolorations continues.
A beta blanket around SSME 2 was noted to be debonded. The debonded area was
10.85 inches circumferentially and 1.81 inches in length. The debonded blanket
was oscillating back and forth during the start sequence. After landing, the
postflight inspection revealed that the outer layer of the SSME 2 closeout
blanket was frayed along a 12-inch length at the 8 o'clock position.
At. 43 seconds mission elapsed time, five cameras recorded a large light-colored
piece of debris that appeared to originate above the SSME 2 and traveled around
the RCS stinger, then along the SSME nozzie, after which the debris fell aft of
the vehicle. Trajectory plots were made of the debris. Analysis of the debris
continues.
LANDING VIDEOS AND FILMS
Eight videos of landing operations plus NASA Select were screened. No
significant observations can be made from this screening and no anomalies were
noted.
DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES AND DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
Twelve DSO'.s were assigned to the STS-43 mission and all were accomplished.
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DEVELOPMENT TEST OBJECTIVES
Ascent
DTO 3010 - Ascent Ving Structural Capability Evaluation - Data were collected
for this DTO, and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor.
DTO 309 - Ascent Flutter Boundary Evaluation - Data were collected for this DTO,
and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor.
DTO 312 - ET TPS Performance (Method 2) - Photographic data, consisting of 17
hand-held 70 mm pictures of the ET, were collected for this experiment and the
data are being evaluated by the sponsor. Five of the views which image the left
side of the ET were very good. For the STS-43 mission, DTO 312 is considered to
be partially accomplished with usable pictures of the ET.
On-Orbit
DTO 645 - Combustion Products Analyzer (Configuration 1) - Data were collected
for this DTO and are being analyzed by the sponsor.
DTO 652 - Vibration Recordings on the Shuttle Treadmill Using an Accelerometer -
Data were collected for this DTO, and the data are being analyzed.
DTO 700-1 - TORS S-Band Forward Link RF Power Level Evaluation - This OTO was
performed and good results were obtained. The data are being evaluated by the
sponsor.
OTO 798 - Alternate Mode OAP Performance Evaluation - This DTO was performed
with satisfactory results. In addition, a real-time decision was made to use
the alternate mode DAP much earlier in the mission to conserve forward RCS
propellant. The use resulted in significant fuel savings.
OTO 799 - PGSC/PAOM Air/Ground Communications Demonstration - The Payload
General Support Computer (PGSC)/Portable Audio Data Modem (PADM) Air/Ground
Communications Demonstration OTO was performed with satisfactory results. The
data are being evaluated by the sponsor.
DTO 1208 - Space Station Cursor Control Device Evaluation II and Advanced
Applications - This OTO was performed successfully with electronic mail (e-mail)
being sent and received by the crew. Some very useful data were obtained that
will aid in the design of Space Station Freedom computer cursor control devices.
Entry/Landing
OTO 248 - Forward RCS Flight Test (8-Second Pulse) - This OTO was performed
during entry and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor.
OTO 805 - Crosswind Landing Performance - This OTO was not performed as winds at
the time of landing were very low and not from a direction that could be used
for this DTO.
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DETAILED SUPPLEMENTARY OBJECTIVES
DSO 0476 - In-Flight Aerobic Exercise - The treadmill operated properly. The
sponsor will report the results after the flight crew has been evaluated.
DSO 0478 - In-Flight Lower Body Negative Pressure - All required runs were
completed and the data are being evaluated by the sponsor.
DSO 0601 - Baroflex Function - Data were collected for this DSO and are being
evaluated by the sponsor.
DSO 0602 - Blood Pressure Variability During Spaceflight - Blood pressure data
were collected from the crew members for this DSO and are being evaluated by the
sponsor.
DSO 0603 - Orthostatic Function During Entry, Landing and Egress - Data were
collected for this DSO and are being evaluated by the sponsor.
DSO 0604 - Visual/Vestibular Integration as a Function of Adaptation - Data were
collected for this DSO and are being evaluated by the sponsor
DSO 0605 - Postural Equilibrium Control During Landing/Egress - Data were
collected for this DSO and are being evaluated by the sponsor.
DSO 0613 - Changes in the Endocrine Regulation of Orthostatic Tolerance
Following Spaceflight - Data were collected for this DSO and are being evaluated
by the sponsor.
DSO 0614 - Head and Gaze Stability During Locomotion - Data were collected for
this DSO and are being evaluated by the sponsor.
DSO 0901 - Documentary Television - All of the video collected on this flight
will be evaluated by the sponsor of this DSO.
DSO 0902 - Documentary Motion Picture Photography - Motion picture data were
collected throughout this mission for this DSO and will be evaluated by the
sponsor.
DSO 0903 - Documentary Still Photography - Still photography data were collected
for the general activities of the flight and will be evaluated by the sponsor.
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TABLE 1.- STS-43 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS
Event
APU activation
SRB UPU activation
Main propulsion
System start
SRB ignition command
(lift-off)
Throttle up to
104 percent thrust
Throttle down to
84 percent thrust
Maximum dynamic
pressure (q)
Throttle down to
67 percent thrust
Throttle up to
104 percent thrust
Both SRM's chamber
pressure at 50 psi
End SRM action
SRB separation command
SRB physical
separation
Throttle down for
3g acceleration
3g acceleration
MECO
ET separation
OMS-1 ignition
Description
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
LU UPU system A start command
LU UPU system B start command
RU UPU system A start command
RU UPU system B start command
Engine 3 start command accepted
Engine 2 start command accepted
Engine 1 start command accepted
SRB ignition command to SRB
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Derived ascent dynamic
pressure
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
LU SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
LH SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
RU SRM chamber pressure
mid-range select
SRB separation command flag
SRB physical separation
Engine 3 command accepted
Engine 2 command accepted
Engine 1 command accepted
Total load factor
MECO command flag
MECO confirm flag
ET separation command flag
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
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Actual time,
G.m. t.
214:14:57:09.82
214:14:57:12.49
214:14:57:16.55
214:15:01:32.17
214:15:01:32.33
214:15:01:32.49
214:15:01:32.65
214:15:01:53.461
214:15:01:53.546
214:15:01:53.698
214~15:01:59.986
214:15:02:03.942
214:15:02:03.906
214:15:02:03.939
214:15:02:24.263
214:15:02:24.226
214:15:02:24.259
214:15:02:50.4
214:15:02:51.945
214:15:02:51.906
214: 15 :02 :51. 900
214:15:02:59.145
214:15:02:59.106
214:15:02:59.100
214:15:04:00.186
214:15:04:00.146
214:15:04:02.568
214:15:04:02.334
214:15:04:05
214:15:04:05.55
214:15:09:30:327
214:15:09:30.310
214:15:09:30.308
214:15:09:30.9
214:15:10:25.9
214:15:10:26.9
214:15:10:44.9
N/A
Not performed -
direct insertion
trajectory flown
TABLE I.- STS-43 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (CONTINUED)
Event
OMS-l cutoff
APU deactivation
OMS-2 ignition
OMS-2 cutoff
Payload bay door open
TDRS/IUS Deployment
Flight control
system checkout
APU start
APU stop
Payload bay door close
APU activation
for entry
Deorbit maneuver
ignition
Deorbit maneuver
cutoff
Entry interface
(400k)
Blackout ends
Terminal area
energy management
Main landing gear
contact
Main landing gear
weight on wheels
Nose landing gear
contact
Description
Left engine hi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
PBD right open 1
PBD left open 1
Voice call
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
PBD left close 1
PBD right close 1
APU-1 GG chamber pressure
APU-2 GG chamber pressure
APU-3 GG chamber pressure
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Left engine bi-prop valve
position
Right engine bi-prop valve
position
Current orbital altitude
above reference ellipsoid
Data locked at high sample
rate
Major mode change (305)
LH MLG tire pressure
RH MLG tire pressure
LH MLG weight on wheels
RH MLG weight on wheels
NLG tire pressure
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Actual time,
G.m.t.
N/A
Not performed -
direct insertion
trajectory flown
214:15:17:17.70
214:15:17:19.24
214:15:17:20.01
214:15:41:50.9
214:15:41:50.9
214:15:44:14.1
214:15:44:13.9
214:16:29:50.7
214:16:31:09.9
214:19:16:00
222:07:13:56.79
222:07:25:01.45
223:08:41:45.9
223:08:43:07.7
223:11:16:17.23
223:12:16:57.71
223:11:38:54.57
223:11:21:15.17
223:11:21:14.97
223:11:23:53.77
223:11:23:53.57
223:11:51:51.50
No blackout
223:12:16.52.00
223:12:23:25.00
223:12:23:25.00
223:12:23:25.97
223:12:23:24.96
223:12:23:34.96
TABLE 1.- STS-43 SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (CONCLUDED)
Event Description Actual time,
G.m.t.
Nose landing gear NLG YT on Yheels -1 223:12:23:35.97
weight on wheels
Yheels stop Velocity with respect to 223:12:24:24.96
runway
APU deactivation APU-1 GG chamber pressure 223:12:45:15.08
APU-2 GG chamber pressure 223:12:24:57.22
APU-3 GG chamber pressure 223:12:45:16.85
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Number Title
TABLE II.- STS-43 PROBLEM TRACKING LIST
Reference Conunents
STS-43-v-01 lcabin Vent Valve Failed toI213:14:20 G.m.t.
Indicate "Closed" IPR 44V-0001
1M 43RFOI
After the vent down from the cabin leak test for August 1 launch
attempt, no closed indication was received from the cabin vent valve.
Subsequent cabin leak test verified valve was closed. Fly as-is for
this mission. KSC troubleshooting verified bad microswitch. Valve
removed and replaced.
STS-43-V-02 No cooling on Water Spray
Boiler 2 on Ascent
214:15:11 G.m.t.
IPR 44V-0015
1M 43RF02
No cooling was noted when operating on Water Spray Boiler 2
controllers A and B. Data indicate freeze-up. Tests during FCS
checkout verified no cooling on either controller. Changeout lube
oil and hydraulic spray valves. Valves in failure analysis.
STs-43-V-03 IPayload Data Interleaver
(PDI) Decommuntation
Problems
STS-43-V-04 IpRSD Hydrogen Tank 1
Heater B Failed Off
214:16:50 G.m.t.
IPR 44V-0014
215:09:30 G.m.t.
1M 43RF03
IPR 44V-0008
Decom 2 dropped in and out of lock on format 7 SHARE data and lost
lock completely for 1 minute. A reload of format and source was
unsuccessful. Went to backup decommutator (1) which experienced drops
in data. Successfully processed data on decom 3 for remainder of
mission. PDI will be removed and replaced. Replacement PDI having
intermittent MTU IRIG B toggle fail hits.
After several dual heater cycles, heater B appeared to fail off. A
subsequent manual activation of heater B verified the failed off
condition. Normal KSC troubleshooting verified blown 5 ampere fuse in
cryo control box. Fuse removed and replaced and heater worked
nominally. Failure analysis shows mechanical failure of fuse. Not
related to STS-40 cryogenic heater failure.
N ISTS-43-V-05 ICCTV Camera D Inoperative 1214:17:48 G.m.t.
\0 FIAR-BCFE-
029-F038
IPR 44V-0004
STS-43-V-06 IAPU 1 Fuel Pump/Gas 214:15:32 G.m.t.
Generator Valve Module IPR 44V-0003
overcooling 1M 43RF04
STS-43-V-07! Low Ku-Band Power 216:13:07 G.m.t.
Indication IPR 44V-0006
1M 43RF05
STS-43-V-Q8 IS-Band Power Amplifier 216:21:30 G.m.t.
Degradation IPR 44V-0005
1M 43RF06
STs-43-V-Q9 IPRSD Hydrogen Manifold 220:18:09 G.m.t.
Valve 1 Failed Open IPR 44V-0007
1M 43RF07
Crew reported that when camera D was powered up, there was no video •
output. Each time the camera was powered, a "S76" camera over-
temperature message occurred. Crew tried to repower the camera on
flight day 2 with no success. Problem repeated during KSC trouble-
shooting. Camera A put in D slot and functioned normally.
After APU shutdown on ascent, the fuel pump/gas generator valve module
(FP/GGVM) cooling system A for APU 1 displayed excessive, erratic water
spraying resulting in overcooling of the fuel pump. Fly timer box
as is.
Ku-Band power output (V74E251IA) dropped from 31 W to -22 W and
recovered in 22 minutes. TV in progress was good. Similar occurrences
at 216:16:40 G.m.t., 218:15:10 G.m.t. and 218:15:29 G.m.t.
Troubleshooting could not duplicate problem. Fly as-is.
S-Band power amplifier 2 has shown a slow power degradation throughout
the flight. Switched to PAl just before entry after conununications
erratic with PA2. Removal and replacement of PA2 has been completed.
Valve failed to open when conunanded closed. Crew cycled switch twice
and no operation was visible. Further valve closures were not be
attempted in flight. Valve closed five times previously on this
flight. KSC troubleshooting after detanking; valve cycled 5 times
successfully. Wire wiggles inconclusive. will splice in instrument-
ation to valve conunand circuit for next flight.
Number I Title
TABLE II.- ST5-43 PROBLEM TRACKING LIST
Reference COllllllents
ST5-43-V-IO IFloodlight failure
Mid-Starboard RPC Trip
219:17:13 G.m.t.
IM 43RF08
IPR 44V-0013
When payload bay floodlights were powered, mid Main C amps increased
15 amps for 3 - 4 seconds, Subsequent testing confirmed mid-starboard
floodlight failed. Light flickering during troubleshooting. Remove
and replace light.
ST5-43-V-II IPartial Pressure Oxygen 223:02:32 G.m.t.
Sensor C Failed IM 43RF09
IPR 44V-oOl6
STS-43-V-12 IAPU I Anomalous Chamber 223:11:58 G.m.t.
Pressure During Entry IM 43RFIO
STS-43-V-13 IMPS Liquid Hydrogen 4 inchlPostlanding
Disconnect-Portion of PR MPS-4-10-0795
Seal Stuck in Flapper IM 43RFli
Sensor C began diverging downward for sensors A and B valves. All
three sensors removed and sent to vendor in dedicated canisters.
Troubleshooting shows no Orbiter contribution to this problem.
For approximately 35 seconds, the APU 1 chamber pressure returned to a
non-zero level after each pulse. indicating a possible leak in the
pulse control valve. Remove and replace APU 1.
Postlanding operations revealed a pressurization leak in the MPS.
Visual inspection showed that a portion of the PD3 flapper seal had
come loose and was lodged in the flapper. Seal removed and replaced
and failure analysis is in progress.
STS-43-V-14 Right-Hand outboard Brake
Pressure Bias
Rollout
IPR 44V-0028
The right-hand outboard brake pressure 4 (V51P0744A) appeared biased
approximately 200 psi lower than right-hand outboard brake pressure 2.
Ground troubleshooting on August 14 could not duplicate. Similar
phenomenon, to a lesser extent, seen on previous flights of OV-I04 d
(IFA STS-37-V-17). Further troubleshooting week of 9/11. Look for
funnies in brake skid control - If no repeat, remove and replace servo
module and antiskid control box.
w
o
STS-43-V-15 I-z star TrackerjLight
Shade Shutter Light Leak
STS-43-V-16 IRight Main Engine
Repressurized to 33 psia
During Entry
222:12:27 G.m.t.
IPR 44V-0029
223:12:23 G.m.t.
IPR 44V-0020
IM 43RF14
Star tracker exhibited intermittent star presence while pointed at the
Sun with the shutter closed. This condition indicates shutter is not
closed. No repeat during troubleshooting. Fly as-is.
During entry, the right engine liquid oxygen inlet pressure (V41PI330C)
tracked the manifold pressure during repressurization. Initial KSC
troubleshooting showed no leakage in prevalve. Tests and X-rays showed
CV 35 stuck open. Replacement of valve will be made.
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